When a revolutionary civil war develops to the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, the domestic reactionaries, imperialism often adopts other methods in order to maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within or sends armed forces to help the domestic reactionaries directly. At such a time, foreign imperialism and domestic reaction stand quite openly at one pole while the masses of the people stand at the other pole, thus forming the principal contradiction which determines or influences the development of the other contradictions. The assistance given by various capitalist countries to the Russian reactionaries after the October Revolution is an example of armed intervention. Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal in 1927 is an example of splitting the revolutionary front.


Ibrahim al Jafari until recently was Iraq’s interim prime minister replacing the butcher Iyad Allawi. However Washington and the Shia bloc, those aligned with Al Hakim wanted him out but feared the repercussions as he is backed by Moqtada who has the support of 2 million of the poorest Shia in Iraq.

Following Rice’s visit to Iraq, an ultimatum was made to replace Jafari with Jawad al-Maliki – No. 2 official in the terrorist Al Dawa party, the Shiite fundamentalist sect-party led by Jaafari.

Far from being a figure that can unite Iraq’s warring parties, Maliki is a militant Shiite partisan. Maliki spent many years in exile in Iran. In 1980, he fled Iraq to escape a brutal crackdown on Da’awa by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Initially he took refuge in Iran, where the Shiite fundamentalist regime of Ayatollah Khomeni had come to power the year before. He left for Syria, however, shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1981.. Maliki was a main author of Iraq’s divisive constitution and he was a leader (along with Ahmed Chalabi, the neoconservatives’ pet) of the viciously excessive purge of Baathists in Iraq after the war in 2003, a move now seen as having seriously exacerbated the current civil war.

A factor in the US endorsement for Maliki is undoubtedly his role on the constitutional committee. He is a man they know will adapt himself to American demands. The US-vetted document, much of which was probably drafted by the US embassy, established the means for the plunder of Iraq’s oil reserves by allowing provinces of Iraq to form “regions” that have authority over all new oil and gas fields.

Last year Maliki pushed for a law that would have imposed the death penalty not only for insurgents but even their sympathizers, including anyone found to “finance, propagate, cover up, support, or provide shelter for the terrorists, no matter how involved they are.” He has bitterly condemned not only the Sunni-led resistance that opposes the U.S. occupation, but also the two moderate, secular parties that hold several dozen seats in Iraq’s parliament, led, respectively, by Salah Mutlaq and Iyad Allawi, the former a secular Iraqi nationalist who claims to maintain a dialogue with elements of the resistance and the latter a secular Shiite who spent years on the CIA’s payroll as an opponent of Saddam Hussein. “It should be recalled that some of the electoral lists contain elements that were possibly part of the machinery of the old regime, i.e. Baathists who are subject to the de-Baathification law [and] intelligence agents or those who got involved in the Iraqi Intelligence Service immediately before the collapse of the regime,” warned Maliki.

He enthusiastically endorsed the wholesale purge of the police force and the Interior Ministry that was imposed by Bayan Jabr, the hard-line official of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), saying, “Hateful elements have penetrated the security services and we must purge them.” The result, of course, was the creation of a ministry whose commandos are heavily infiltrated by SCIRI death squads responsible for the murders of thousands of Iraqis.

In the deal that brought Maliki to power, the Shiite bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance, deigned to make a deal with the two Kurdish warlord parties that control the Kurdish enclave in the north, and with the Sunni fundamentalist religious bloc, the Iraqi Islamic Party, which is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood secret society. But pointedly they excluded both Mutlaq and Allawi. By including the Sunni fundamentalists, whose leaders got both a deputy president slot and speaker of the parliament, Maliki and the Shiites put their stamp of approval on the Lebanonization of Iraq. And by excluding the secular Mutlaq and Allawi, they made it clear that Iraq has no place for anyone who wants a united state with a strong central government.

How can Maliki approach any sort of deal to quell the Sunni resistance? He can’t. In fact, Maliki has denounced the off-again, on-again U.S. dialogue with the resistance as a plot to restore the Baath party to power. So how can Maliki offer anything to the growing Sunni-led insurgency other than war?

How can Maliki move to amend Iraq’s constitution in a way that can right its obvious wrongs? He can’t. As its author, he is committed to the constitution’s provisions for radical federalism (i.e., the breakup of Iraq) and for giving the bulk of Iraqi oil revenues to the Shiites and Kurds. He is also committed to the constitutional provisions that enshrine Islam at the heart of the Iraqi legal system.

How can Maliki move to assure Sunnis that he will put an end to the Shiite death squads in the SCIRI-run Interior Ministry? He can’t. He is on record asserting that the way to build the police is to integrate Shiite and Kurdish militia into the police, thus guaranteeing that police commandos continue to be seen as the armed wing of the Shiite movement.

All of this means that the Maliki-led government of Iraq will have little or no effect outside the Green Zone in Baghdad. Battle lines in the civil war are hardening, as exemplified by the unprecedented house-to-house street fighting last week in the north Baghdad neighborhood of Adhamiya. There, in a mostly Sunni part of town, local neighborhood militia fought pitched battles with Iraqi government forces, led by the notorious Shiite-dominated police. It was the first recorded battle in which an entire Baghdad Sunni enclave fought against government troops and against U.S. forces. Meanwhile, even as Maliki’s name was being announced, dozens of bodies continued to turn up in Baghdad morgues—including seven in Adhamiya—all victims of death squads. And nine more U.S. troops were killed in Iraq over the weekend.

Just the kind of man the U.S.A. can do business with.